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NO. 940775-CA
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BRIEF OF PETITIONER
Petition for Review of an order of the Board of Review of
the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah dated December 20,
1994 bearing Board of Review docket numbers 94-BR-310, 94-BR-313,
94-A-1605-R

Gregory DeBloois
683 West 2200 North
Clinton, Utah 84015
Lorin Blauer, Esq,
Department of Emp. Security
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
United States Attorney
by Robert H. Wilde
Special Assistant United
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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this appeal are those listed in the caption,
the Department of the Air Force, the Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, and Gregory DeBloois.

In the event this petition results in a reported case the
Petitioner requests the court style this matter the Department of
the Air Force v. DeBloois rather that the Department of the Air
Force v. Board of Review in order to avoid confusion between this
matter and the two other reported cases already styled Department
of the Air Force v. Board of Review.
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STATEMENT OF .JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear the
petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16, and Utah Code Ann.
35-4-10.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION:
The issues for which Petitioner seeks review are the
following:
1.

Did the Board of Review commit legal error in

determining that the Petitioner and the Department of Employment
Security shared fault when the Administrative Law Judge failed to
find for the Air Force at the conclusion of the first evidentiary
hearing?

The standard of review for reviewing conclusions of law

is to review without deference under a correction of error
standard.

Uintah Oil Assoc, v. County Bd. of Equalization, 853

P.2d 894 (Utah 1993).

This issue was preserved in the appeal to

the Board of Review, record at 211.
2.

Are the findings off fact supporting the legal

conclusion of shared fault supported by substantial evidence
within the record?

The standard of review for reviewing findings

of fact is to affirm only if the findings are supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court.

Utah Cede Ann. 63-46b-16(4)(g).

This issue

was preserved in the appeal to the Board of Review, record at
211.
3.

Did the finding of shared fault constitute an abuse of

discretion by the Board of Review?

The standard of review for

this issue is "is the decision reasonable and rational?",
Wagstaff v. Department of Employment S e c , 826 P.2d 1069 (Utah
App. 1992).

This issue was preserved in the appeal to the Board
1

of Review, record at 211.
DETERMINATIVE LAW:
Statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal are included in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a petition for review of a final order of the Board
of Review of the Industrial Commission holding the Petitioner
(Air Force) and the Department of Employment Security (Employment
Security) shared fault in the entry of an order by an
administrative law judge (ALJ) allowing Gregory J. DeBloois
(DeBloois) unemployment benefits which decision the ALJ later
reversed.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

DeBloois was fired by the Air Force.
unemployment benefits.

They were denied.

He applied for
He appealed and was

given an evidentiary hearing before the ALJ.
benefits.

The Air Force appealed to the Board of Review which

sustained the ALJ.
review.

The ALJ allowed

The Air Force petitioned this court for

Before the time for briefing on that Petition for Review

Employment Security contacted the Air Force and a stipulation was
reached referring the matter back to the ALJ for an additional
hearing during which the ALJ was specifically instructed, by
Employment Security, to apply applicable law pertaining to expert
testimony.
The second evidentiary hearing was held and DeBloois was
denied benefits.

The ALJ did not specifically address the issue

of time for repayment to the Air Force in his order entered after
the second hearing.

The Air Force then asked that it be
2

immediately reimbursed for money it had paid to compensate
Employment Security for benefits paid DeBloois.
C.

DISPOSITION BELOW

The Board of Review reviewed the second order of the ALJ and
held, in its order of December 20, 1994, that Employment Security
and Air Force "shared" fault for the prior improper payment
following the first hearing.

Review of the December 20, 1994

order is sought here.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Gregory DeBloois was employed as an electronics mechanic at
Hill Air Force Base, record at 1.

As a result of drug related

offenses, Mr. DeBloois and the Air Force entered into a "last
chance agreement" to the effect that he would have no more
misconduct, record at 7.

As part of that agreement, he agreed to

random drug testing on short notice when requested by the Air
Force, record at 7.

Subsequently, Mr. DeBloois was asked to

report for urinalysis, record at 4.

The specimen he then

submitted was tested and determined to be water, not urine,
record at 5.

Pursuant to the last chance agreement, Mr.

DeBloois' employment with the Air Force was terminated for
failing to submit a urine specimen for testing, record at 4.
Mr. DeBloois applied for unemployment benefits which were
denied by Employment Security, record at 11.

Mr. DeBloois

appealed the initial decision and after an evidentiary hearing
the Employment Security ALJ found the Air Force had not met its
burden of proof to show DeBloois was terminated for just cause
under the code and regulations, record at 75.
At the beginning of the hearing the parties stipulated the
issue to be determined was whether "... the Claimant either
failed a drug test or tampered with that drug test", record at 25.
3

Air Force called three witnesses.

DeBloois's supervisor,

Mr. Gailey, who testified he fired DeBloois for violating the
stipulated settlement agreement, record at 42.

Elise Kidd, who

testified she was an Employee Relations Assistant for the Air
Force who assists in administration of the drug testing program,
record at 52.

She described the general procedures used in drug

testing and DeBloois's right to question the results with medical
and other personnel, record at 52.
Air Force also called Dr. David J. Kuntz who testified he
was the director of technical operations for Northwest
Toxicology, the firm with whom Air Force had contracted to
perform drug testing.

He has a BA in Pharmacy, an MA and PhD

degrees in Pharmaceutical Sciences, record at 30.

He testified

he has been employed full time in forensic urine testing since
1988 and is in charge of the day to day testing and
interpretation for Northwest Toxicology, record at 30.
Dr. Kuntz further testified that based on his expertise in
the field and the sample provided by DeBloois DeBloois had
tampered urine specimen and submitted water rather than urine,
record at 33.

Numerous factors led him to the conclusion the

sample was water.

First, the physical appearance of the specimen

led to that conclusion.
shaken as urine does.

It was clear and did not foam when
The physical appearance of the specimen

triggered additional testing of the sample for adulteration,
record at 31 & 33.

Urine has a specific gravity of 1.03 to

1.003.

It would only be 1.00 if it was especially dilute, record

at 32.

He also testified the documents associated with the

specimen indicated there were no problems with the chain of
custody, record at 31.
4

The ALJ found DeBloois's urine sample was especially dilute
because he had consumed six or seven glasses of water the morning
of the test, record at 71.
evidence in the record.
,!

This finding was not supported by

DeBloois actual testimony was that he

. . . drank water until he had to go" record at 58, that he

normally "... drink [s] a horrendous amount of water trying to,
you know be healthy and lose weight and what not" record at 41,
"You're supposed to drink a minimum of what? eight to ten glasses
of water a day?" record at 61.

DeBloois himself did not suggest

his water consumption resulted in the sample containing water
rather than urine.

When asked by the ALJ to what he attributed

"... the test results to be as provided to us by Dr. Kunz (sic)"
he replied "I have no idea, sir", record at 59.

Contrary to the

ALJ's finding nothing in the record of that hearing supports the
position that DeBloois drank seven glasses of water waiting to
provide a specimen or even that he drank more water that day than
he normally does.
Nothing anywhere in the record of the first hearing suggests
that even if DeBloois drank seven glasses of water that volume
would be sufficient to cause the urine to be "especially dilute."
Dr. Kuntz testified that even if the specimen was diluted urine
it would still foam but just foam less, record at 33.

The

DeBloois specimen did not foam at all, record at 31-33.
Another test was performed for the presence of creatinine, a
substance present in urine.

There was no creatinine in

DeBloois's sample, record at 37.

DeBloois's sample had a ph of

6.3 which is the ph of water but not of urine, record at 37.
Dr. Kuntz testified that the only aspect of the testing done
at the collection site is for temperature, record at 35.

He also

testified people have used chemical and mechanical warmers to
5

warm specimens in the past, record at 36.

The person giving the

sample can manipulate the temperature of the sample by reading it
from the container which has a temperature device on the side,
record at 36.

The specimen container did not appear to be

tampered with after having left the collection site, record at
37.

In other words the container and the label identifying it as

belonging to DeBloois were intact and in good condition when they
arrived at Northwest Toxicology.
The ALJ's decision following the first hearing is found at
page 70 of the record.

The findings of fact consume one and one

half pages of that decision, record at 71-72.

Virtually all of

the findings deal with the mechanics of DeBloois providing his
specimen and his denial that he provided water.

Despite 11 pages

of testimony by Dr. Kuntz on the chemical and physical evidence
showing the sample was not urine the ALJ concluded "The
Administrative Law Judge was unable to conclude, through
competent evidence, that the claimant did not submit a legitimate
urine specimen ..." record at 75.

He further concluded "There

was no other medical evidence presented at the hearing to confirm
that the liquid in the sample bottle provided by the claimant was
not his own urine" record at 75.

Nowhere in his decision did the

ALJ give any reason for wholly rejecting the expert testimony of
Dr. Kuntz.

He did not find any lack of foundation, insufficient

education or experience, or otherwise discredit Dr. Kuntz as an
expert, he simply ignored him and his testimony.
In the transcript of the first hearing the ALJ does give
insight into his thought processes.
"Well, I guess in this particular hearing, what I had
not had provided in the way of evidence is any type of
other information from the testing laboratory as to
what other testing procedures were -- was used. I have
6

no -- I have no test form from the employer. I do not
know that -- excuse me, from Northwest Toxicology, I do
not know for a certainty, I do not have documentation
that the, uh, Northwest Toxicology tested for, uh, drug
-- drugs or whether or not they, uh, tested for any
other substance in that urine. We -- we do not have
that report, and I'm assuming, Mr., uh, Price, you
don't have that as part of your documentation, record
at 67.
Though the decision does not contain any findings faulting
the chain of custody from the record the ALJ appears to be
concerned about a chain of custody issue, also at page 67 of the
record.

However, the exhibits offered at the hearing establish

the chain of custody and show the sample was taken and mailed on
February 8th and analyzed on February 10th, record at 5, 6, and
Dr Kuntz testified the chain of custody documents were in order,
record at 31.
From the findings and the decision it is clear the ALJ
declined to accept the expert testimony of Dr. Kuntz because, as
he stated, "The Administrative Law Judge was unable to conclude,
through competent evidence, that the claimant did not submit a
legitimate urine specimen on February 8, 1993" record at 75.

In

other words, the ALJ did not understand that the opinion of an
expert is competent evidence.
The Air Force appealed the ALJ's decision to the Board of
Review which sustained the ALJ in a 2-1 decision, record at 90.
The Air Force sought review in this court of the decision of the
Board of Review based on the ALJ's complete disregard of expert
testimony which established the sample given by Mr. DeBloois was
not urine, record at 98.
7

After the Air Force filed the Petition for Review, the Air
Force and the Employment Security agreed to have the matter
remanded for rehearing by the ALJ, record at 105.

In preparation

for the rehearing, the Board of Review provided specific
instructions to the ALJ on certain evidentiary matters at issue
in the case, record at 112.

In that decision Employment Security

specifically instructed the ALJ, by underlining portions of the
remand decision, "The above documentation will be admissible as
competent under various exceptions to the hearsay rule, including
Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence respecting 'records of
regularly conducted activity,' unless determined otherwise by a
court of law." [emphasis in the original] record at 113.

In

other words, Employment Security saw the error of the ALJ's
reasoning in his first hearing and instructed him on the same law
Air Force had complained about in its appeal to the Board of
Review from the first hearing, record at 101.
The ALJ reopened the hearing and, after considering all the
evidence, found, in a decision dated March 25, 1994, DeBloois had
been discharged for just cause under the code and applicable
regulations, record at 174.

At the second hearing, held March

23, 1994, the ALJ did not receive any types of information
different than he had in the first hearing.

Dr. Kuntz did appear

personally and described the same tests which had been run on the
specimen in more detail but all of the types of evidence
submitted were the same.

The ALJ specifically declined to accept

documents pertaining to the chain of custody of the specimen,
8

record at 156, but ruled for Air Force nonetheless.
In the second hearing DeBloois acknowledged that his
specimen had been tested by a second laboratory at the request of
his union and that test had also found the specimen was water
record at 140,
At the time of the March 25, 1994 Decision, the initial
action was still pending before the Utah Court of Appeals, having
never been dismissed by that court.
In the time of the March 25, 1994 Decision, the ALJ found
there had been an overpayment to Mr. DeBloois in the amount of
$6,240.00.

This overpayment represented compensation paid to Mr.

DeBloois as a result of the prior decision of the ALJ, which was
subsequently reversed.

The ALJ found this overpayment to be the

fault of Mr. DeBloois, record at 183.
The Air Force pays unemployment compensation pursuant to
R562-85 of the Utah Administrative Regulations.

That chapter of

the Industrial Commission's regulations deals with contributions
and reimbursement of unemployment benefits by governmental units.
R562-85-5 addresses "Reimbursable Employer's Liability for
Benefits Paid".

Significant in the language of that section is

that which reads "The employer will not be liable for benefits
overpaid as a result of a Department decision which is later
reversed.

Any benefits established as an overpayment due to

claimant fault will be deducted from the employer's liability or
refunded as the overpayment is repaid by the claimant."
In the ALJ's March 25, 1994 decision and the subsequent
9

decision of the Board of Review Employment Security has
determined the Air Force is not liable for Mr. DeBloois'
unemployment compensation, as it should have in the first
instance.
repayment.

Rule 562-6d-4(2)(a)(1) deals with discretion for
It allows collection to be postponed until additional

benefits become due, if they become due, "if the Department or
the employer share fault in the creation of the overpayment."
The ALJ found that the Air Force shared fault because it failed
to elicit evidence upon which he could sustain the prior denial
of benefits, record at 183.

Employment Security sustained that

decision in its December 20, 1994 decision, record at 223.
During the first hearing DeBloois was sworn and agreed to
tell the truth, record at 57.

While under oath he testified he

provided a urine specimen, record at 59.

The evidence adduced at

that hearing showed the specimen he provided was water.

He

subsequently had the specimen tested again through his union.
That test showed the specimen he provided was water, record at
140.

The ALJ, and the Board of Review ultimately concurred with

the position of Air Force and Dr. Kuntz that the specimen was
water, record at 183, 223.

The only logical conclusion which can

come from this chain of events is that DeBloois was lying when he
testified he provided a urine specimen.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Air Force does not share fault for the overpayment.

The Air

Force provided expert testimony which established the specimen
was dilute.

The ALJ chose to ignore that testimony and relied on
10

his own speculation in entering findings of fact and reaching
conclusions of law.

Had the ALJ applied the law he would have

ruled for the Air Force in the first instance.
DeBloois provided no

DeBloois's evidence was fraudulent.
evidence which would support his position.

His defense was only

that he didn't know how it could have happened.
had his specimen tested a second time.
sample he submitted was water.

He subsequently

That test also showed the

Because he lied his claim was

fraudulent.
Employment Security has a statutory duty to determine the
facts.

The ALJ failed to adequately inquire into areas upon

which he ultimately based his decision.

The result was fault of

Employment Security but not the Air Force.
ARGUMENT
A. THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT SHARE FAULT
In his analysis of the evidence it appears the ALJ was
trying to force the round peg of this case into the square hole
of Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App.
1989).

There the employee was allowed benefits after being

terminated for marijuana use because the only evidence the
employer offered concerning the testing was hearsay from an
office manager who had no personal knowledge of the procedure.
Grace Drilling does not apply in this case because Air Force
submitted appropriate evidence through Dr. Kuntz, and the quality
of the test was never an issue.
Evidentiary procedures used in administrative hearings in
11

Utah are less strict than those used in Utah courts, Utah Code
Ann. 63-46b-8.

The differences identified in Utah Code Ann. 63-

46b-8 serve only to relax the standards of the rules of evidence.
That being the case it follows that evidence which must be
considered in a court of law must also be considered in an
administrative hearing.
The ALJ ruled as he did because he didn't have any document
showing the testing laboratory results.

He made this ruling in

the face of extensive testimony by Dr. Kuntz, who had been
qualified as an expert without objection, as to the types of
tests which had been performed and what they showed.

As an

expert Dr. Kuntz testified numerous tests showed DeBloois had
substituted water for urine and that the specimen was in fact
water.
While it is unlikely the ALJ hears much expert testimony
while presiding over unemployment hearings that fact does not
allow him to completely ignore such testimony when it is offered.
Documents are not the only variety of evidence which must be
considered when offered.

Rule 401, Utah R. Evd. instructs

"Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would have
been without the evidence."

Where expert testimony will assist

the ALJ in determining a fact he must consider it, Rule 702 Utah
R. Evd.

An expert witness specifically need not rely on

admissible evidence in order to form and express an expert
12

opinion, Rule 703, Utah R. Evd.

Neither the ALJ nor DeBloois

cross examined Dr. Kuntz on the validity of the facts underlying
the opinions given in his testimony as an expert witness.
The record clearly shows the ALJ refused to consider the
expert testimony of Dr. Kuntz because he did not understand the
issues.

Had the ALJ understood the rules of evidence and the

place of expert testimony he could have reached no conclusion
other than the specimen was water.

When he reconvened the

hearing at the direction of Employment Security the testimony he
received was of exactly the same varieties he received in the
first hearing.

Air Force put on Dr. Kuntz who said the tests

show it was water and DeBloois said it was not.

Having been

instructed by Employment Security as to the place of expert
testimony the ALJ then made the ruling he should have made in the
first instance.
There is absolutely no basis in the record for the ALJ's
self serving conclusion "The Administrative Law Judge allowed
benefits on the basis of inadequate evidence submitted by the
employer ..." record at 183.

In reality, the ALJ allowed

benefits based upon his own ignorance of the rules of evidence
and the admissibility of the evidence which had been presented to
him.

The Air Force presented the same evidence at both hearings

and bears no fault, shared or otherwise.
B. FRAUD OVERPAYMENTS MUST BE REPAID TO THE AIR FORCE
R562-5e, Utah Admin. Rules, pertains to fraud.
11

It provides

[t] here must be a willful misrepresentation or concealment of
13

information for the purpose of obtaining unemployment benefits to
which the claimant was not entitled for fraud to exist." R562-5e1.

R562-5e-2 defines the elements of fraud under the regulation

to be materiality, knowledge, and wilfulness.

The ALJ could only

get to the conclusion he ultimately reached if DeBloois had
defrauded both Employment Security and the Air Force by filing a
false claim and by lying at both hearings.

Indeed, the ALJ

found, and the Board of Review sustained the finding that "The
only logical conclusion to be reached in this matter is that the
claimant tampered with the testing procedures by substituting a
substance for his urine" record at 181.
R562-5e-5 provides "Repayment of overpayments established
under this section of the Act will be collected in accordance
with provisions of the Rules of Section 35-4-6(d) [now Utah Code
Ann. 35-4-406(4) (a)] or by civil action ..."

The term "will" in

the regulation does not provide discretion to Employment Security
in collecting payments obtined by fraud.

Further, in his

decision the ALJ cites R562-6d-4(2)(b), "The Department cannot
exercise repayment discretion for fraud overpayments and these
amounts are subject to all collection procedures" record at 183.
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. 35-4-406(4) (a) requires "Any
person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum as
benefits under this chapter to which he was not entitled shall
repay the sum to the commission for the fund."

This section of

the Act differs from others in which recoupment is discretionary.
Since DeBloois obtained the payments through his active
14

fraud in the first instance they are subject to mandatory
collection.

Employment Security does not have the discretion to

require the Air Force to wait for DeBloois to apply for benefits
at some time in the future.
C. THE ALJ WAS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN FACTS SUPPORTING HIS DECISION
The dissent in the decision of the Board of Review correctly
notes the ALJ was required, by the Administrative Procedures Act,
to "... regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full
disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties
reasonable opportunity to present their position." Utah Code Ann.
63-46b-8(l)(a).

The dissent also cited Nelson v. Department of

Employment Security, 801 P.2d 158 (Utah App. 1990) which shows
the higher level of inquiry required of an ALJ where the parties
were, as here, not represented by counsel.
The ALJ's failure to follow up on issues he considered
evidentiarily deficient, though they were ultimately shown not to
be deficient, shows "fault" on the part of Employment Security
but not of the Air Force.
CONCLUSION
DeBloois retained his employment with the Air Force only by
agreeing to remain free of misconduct of any kind, including
providing urine samples upon the Air Force's request.
not.

He did

He then applied for benefits knowing he had substituted

water for urine in the specimen he provided.
evidentiary hearings he lied while under oath.
fault.
15

During two
He was clearly at

When the ALJ conducted DeBloois's appeal hearing he failed
to grasp the legal implications of the testimony of Dr. Kuntz and
accordingly ignored it.

He also failed to make sufficient

inquiry into facts on which he ultimately based his decision.
He, and accordingly his employer Employment Security, was at
fault.
The Air Force provided substantial evidence which when
viewed in light of the whole record leads .only to the conclusion
that DeBloois's specimen was water, not urine.

The ALJ was

required to accept that evidence or explain why he did not.
There was no such explanation.

The sufficiency of the evidence

was so clear to Employment Security that it stipulated to sending
the matter back to the ALJ without attempting to defend the Air
Force's initial Petition for Review.

To now suggest that the

evidence was inadequate and the Air Force is at fault is absurd.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Petitioner asks this court to reverse the decision of the
Board of Review denying immediate payment and order the
Department of Employment Security to take whatever actions are
legal and necessary to recoup the money improperly paid DeBloois.
Dated this

///?

da

Y

of

March, 1995.

Robert<JI\ Wil
Attorney for Petlitidner
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Ann. 35-4-406(4)(a)
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-8
Utah R. Evd. 401
Utah R. Evd. 702
Utah R. Evd. 703
R562-5e, Utah Admin. Rules
R562-6d-4(2) Utah Admin. Rules
R562-85-5 Utah Admin. Rules
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35-4-406

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Swiecicki v Department of Emp Sec , 667 P2d
28 (Utah 1983)
Leaving employment in order to follow a
spouse to a rev> location is \oluntary" witnin
tne meaning of the sta u*e Chandle r \ Depart
ment oi EmD Sec 678 ?2d 315 (Utah 1984)
SuD»tantial e\iaence buoported the boards
finding that employee ler\ work of his own
vohuon where he quit ^ather than work nignts
for a two-wee* perod Aaams \ Board of Re
view 776 P2d 639 (Utah Ct ApD 1989)

work force reduction does not render the decision involuntary Robinson v Department of
Emp Sec 827 P 2d 250 (Utah Ct App 1992)
Cited in Department of Emp Sec \ Ninth
Circuit Court ex rel Cedar CVv Dep t 718 P 2d
782 (Utah 1986) Allen v Department of Emp
Sec 781 P2d 888 (Utah Ct Aup 1989,, De
partment of Air Force v Swider, 824 P2d 448
'Utah Ct App 1991)

—Work force reduction.
A decision to quit in the face of an impending
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments affecting nght to unemployment compensation,
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L Rev 95, 113
58ALR3d674
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi
Alcoholism or intoxication as ground for discial Decisions — Labor, 1988 Utah L Rev 236
charge justifying denial of unemployment comC.J.S. — 81 C J S Social Security and Public pensation, 64 A L R 4th 1151
Welfare §§ 161, 211, 212, 214 to 216, 218-220,
Unemployment compensation burden of
222-264
proof as to voluntariness of separation, 73
AX R. — Employee's insubordination as bar- A L R 4th 1093
ling unemployment compensation, 26 A L R 3d
Eligibility for unemployment compensation
1333
of employee who left employment based on
Work-connected inefficiency or negligence as belief that involuntary discharge was immi"misconduct" barring unemployment compen- nent, 79 A L R 4th 528
sation, 26 A L R 3d 1356
Unemployment compensation
eligibility
Unemployment compensation eligibility as where claimant leaves employment under ciraffected by claimant's refusal to work at par- cumstances interpreted as a firing by the claimticular times or on particular shifts, 35 ant but as a voluntary quit by the employer, 80
A L R 4th 7
A L R 3d 1129, 12 A L R 4th 611
Unemployment compensation eligibility as
Termination of employment because of pregnancy as affecting nght to unemployment com- affected by claimant's refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts for domespensation, 51 A L R 3d 254
Right to unemployment compensation as af- tic or family reasons, 2 A L R 5th 475
fected by receipt of pension, 56 A L R 3d 520
Unemployment compensation claimant's eliRight to unemployment compensation as af- gibility as affected by loss of, or failure to
fected by receipt of social security benefits, 56 obtain, license, certificate, or similar qualificaALR3d552
tion for continued employment, 15 A L R 5th
Eligibility of strikers to obtain public assis- 653
tance, 57 A L R 3d 1303
Key Numbers. — Social Security and Public
Discharge for absenteeism or tardiness as Welfare <s=> 381

35-4-406. Claims for benefits — Continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n —
Appeal — Notice of decision — R e p a y m e n t of
benefits fraudulently received,
(1) (a) Claims for benefits shall be made and shall be determined by the
commission or its authorized representative or referred to an administrative law judge in accordance with rules adopted by the commission
(b) Each employer shall post and maintain m places readily accessible
to individuals in his service pnnted statements concerning benefit rights,
claims for benefits, and the other matters relating to the administration of
this chapter as prescribed by rule of the commission.
(c) Each employer shall supply to individuals in his service copies of the
printed statements or other materials relating to claims for benefits when
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and as the commission may by rule prescribe. The printed statements and
other materials shall be supplied by the commission to each employer
without cost to the employer.
(2) (a) Jurisdiction over benefits shall be continuous.
(b) Upon its own initiative or upon application of any party affected, the
commission or its authorized representatives may on t h e basis of change
in conditions or because of a mistake as to facts, review a decision allowing
or disallowing in whole or in part a claim for benefits.
(c) The review shall be conducted in accordance with rules adopted by
the commission and may result in a new decision t h a t may award,
terminate, continue, increase, or decrease benefits, or may result in a
referral of the claim to an appeal tribunal.
(d) Notice of any redetermination shall be promptly given to the party
applying for redetermination and to other parties entitled to notice of the
original determination, in the manner prescribed in this section with
respect to notice of an original determination.
(e) The new order shall be subject to review and appeal as provided in
this section.
(f) A review may not be made after one year from t h e date of the
original determination, except in cases of fraud or claimant fault as
provided in Subsection (4).
(3) (a) The claimant or any other party entitled to notice of a determination
as provided may file an appeal from the determination with an administrative law judge within ten days after the date of mailing of the notice to
his last-known address or, if the notice is not mailed, within ten days after
the date of delivery of the notice.
(b) Unless the appeal or referral is withdrawn with permission of the
administrative law judge, after affording the parties reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing, the administrative law judge shall m a k e findings
and conclusions and on t h a t basis affirm, modify, or reverse the determination.
(c) The administrative law judge shall first give notice of the pendency
of an appeal to the commission, which may then be a party to the
proceedings.
(d) The parties shall be promptly notified of the administrative law
judge's decision and shall be furnished with a copy of t h e decision and the
findings and conclusions in support of the decision.
(e) The decision is considered to be final unless, within 30 days after the
date of mailing of notice to the party's last-known address, or in the
absence of mailed notice, within ten days after the delivery of the notice,
further appeal is initiated under Section 35-4-508.
(4) (a) Any person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum as
benefits under this chapter to which he was not entitled shall repay the
sum to the commission for the fund.
(b) If any person, by reason of his own fault, has received any sum as
benefits under this chapter to which under a redetermination or decision
p u r s u a n t to this section he has been found not entitled, h e shall repay the
sum, or shall, in the discretion of the commission, have t h e sum deducted
from any future benefits payable to him, or both.
(c) In any case in which under this subsection a claimant is liable to
repay to the commission any sum for the fund, the sum shall be collectible
in the same manner as provided for contributions due u n d e r this chapter.
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(5) (a) If any person has received any sum as benefits under this chapter to
which under a redetermination or decision he was not entitled, and it has
been found that he was without fault in the matter, he is not liable to repay
the sum but shall be liable to have the sum deducted from any future
benefits payable to him.
(b) The commission may waive recovery of the overpayment if it is
shown to the satisfaction of the commission that the claimant has the
inability to meet more than the basic needs of survival for an indefinite
period lasting at least several months.
History: L. 1941, ch. 40, § 6; C. 1943,
42-2a-6;L.1949,ch.53,§ 1; 1951, ch. 50, § 1;
1955, ch. 60, § 1; 1976, ch. 19, § 3; 1989, ch.
120, § 3;1990,ch.255,§ 1; 1993, ch. 241, § 2;
C. 1953, 35-4-6; renumbered by L. 1994, ch.
169, § 35.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted "administrative law judge" for "appeal referee"
throughout the section.
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993,
revised the subsection designations to substi-

tute numbers for letters, correcting an internal
reference accordingly; in Subsection (3), inserted "first" in the second sentence of the
second paragraph and substituted "30 days" for
"ten days" in the second sentence of the third
paragraph; and made stylistic changes
throughout the section.
The 1994 amendment, effective October 2,
1994, renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as § 35-4-6, and made related reference and other stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeal.
Due process of law.
Failure to timely file appeal.
—Good cause.
Nature of proceeding.
Notice.
Reduction of penalty unauthorized.
Repayment of benefits.
Review of eligibility determinations.
Cited.
Appeal.
Claimant has right of appeal from determination of deputy of ineligibility to benefits, and
appeal tribunal has right to modify, affirm or
set aside deputy's decision. National Tunnel &
Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 39,
102 P.2d 508 (1940).
Due process of law.
The fact that claimant was not present at
hearing by representative which resulted in
denial of relief did not deprive him of due
process of law where he was present at subsequent hearing and adduced evidence before
appeal examiner, and both examiner and industrial commission, in reviewing case, had right
to consider findings of representative. Employees of Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99
Utah 88, 104 P.2d 197 (1940).
Failure to timely file appeal.
In the absence of a timely filing of appeal
from determination denying plaintiff unem-

ployment benefits, the appeals referee had no
jurisdiction to hear plaintifFs case. Jones v.
Department of Emp. Sec, 641 P.2d 156 (Utah
1982).
Where claimant was notified of denial of
benefits after deadline for filing appeal, and
subsequently filed appeal approximately three
weeks after receiving notification, his appeal
was barred not for his excusable failure to file
before the deadline, but rather for his unexplained delay in acting after receiving notification. Wood v. Department of Emp. Sec, 680 R2d
38 (Utah 1984).
A claimant who makes an untimely filing of
an appeal may pursue the appeal if good cause
is shown for the delay, but stress due to family
problems does not constitute good cause for a
delay. Kirkwood v. Department of Emp. Sec,
709 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1985).
Where plaintiff was unable to sufficiently
explain why he filed an appeal more than four
months after he was on notice of his appeal
rights and there was ample evidence that plaintiff learned of his right to appeal significantly
more than ten days before the appeal was filed,
the Industrial Commission did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the appeal was
not timely filed and not delayed for *ood cause.
Arevalo v. Department of Emp. Sec, 745 P.2d
847 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 R2d
1278 (Utah 1988).
Claimant's claim that she was confused by
the term "calendar days" in the notice of her
appeal rights, taking it to mean "working days,"
and that she reasonably needed extra time to
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(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or
power given to an agency by another statute.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-7, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 263.

Cross-References. — Discovery, U.R.C.P.
26 et seq.

63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings
— Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), in all formal
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer:
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the
original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other
proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts
within the agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is
hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at
the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential information disclosed at the hearing.
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-8, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 264; 1988, ch. 72, § 19.

Cross-References. — Judicial notice, Utah
R. Evid. 201.
Privileges, Utah R. Evid. 501 et 8eq.
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STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cross-examination.
Agency decision revoking social worker's license was reversed and his case was remanded
for a new hearing, because the failure to afford
him an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-

nesses against him resulted in "substantial
prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings
— Intervention.
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene
in a formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes
to intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each party. The petition shall
include:
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(b) the name of the proceeding;
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights
or interests are substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under any provision
of law; and
*
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner seeks from the agency.
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if he determines that:
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the
formal adjudicative proceeding; and
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the
intervention.
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to intervene shall be in
writing and sent by mail to the petitioner and each party.
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the
intervenor's participation in the adjudicative proceeding that are necessary for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after
the intervention.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-9, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 265.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Requisites for intervention.
Standing.
Requisites for intervention.
Although Subsection (2) does not grant an
absolute right to intervene, it does establish a
conditional right to intervene if the requisite
legal interest is present. That right is subject
only to the condition that the interests of justice and orderly conduct of the administrative

proceedings will not be impaired. Millard
County v. State Tax Comm'n, 823 P.2d 459
(Utah 1991).
Tax commission's denial of a county's motion
to intervene in a proceeding to redetermine a
taxpayer's sales tax liability was reversed, because the county met the requirements for intervention and the commission's contention
that allowing intervention would clog the entire administrative system was highly exaggerated. Millard County v. State Tax Comm'n,
823 P.2d 459 (Utah 1991).
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Presumption not raised.
Presumption upheld.
Presumption not raised.
Payment of portion of profits to defendant as
partial reimbursement for expenditures of defendant in connection with business premises
did not raise presumption of a partnership, and
plaintiff was required to meet his burden of
proof without aid of presumption. Koesling v.
Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975).

Presumption upheld.
Where mother executed will and trust instrument, and it was later found that the will
had been executed as a result of undue influence, there was a prima facie presumption of
continued undue influence with respect to an
alleged subsequent ratification of the trust.
Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah
1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 75.
Am. J u r . 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§§ 159 to 165, 167.
C.J.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 119.
A.L.R. — Effect of presumption as evidence
or upon burden of proof, where controverting
evidence is introduced, 5 A.L.R.3d 19.
Refusal of defendant in "public figure" libel
case to identify claimed sources as raising presumption against existence of source, 19
A.L.R.4th 919.
Presumptions and evidence respecting iden-

tification of land on which property taxes were
paid to establish adverse possession, 36
A.L.R.4th 843.
Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of
multiple, nonmedical defendants — modern
status, 59 A.L.R.4th 201.
Medical malpractice: presumption or inference from failure of hospital or doctor to produce relevant medical records, 69 A.L.R.4th
906.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=> 305,
325; Evidence «=» 85 et seq.

Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and
proceedings.
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law.
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of
this rule is taken from Rule 302, Uniform
Rules of Evidence (1974). Presumptions in

criminal cases are not treated in this rule. See
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953)
or any subsequent revision of that section.

ARTICLE IV.
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS.
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a tendency to

prove or disprove the existence of any "material fact." Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" accords with the application given to
former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court.
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of remoteness.
Cited.
Effect of remoteness.
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds,
McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298
(Utah 1984).
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah

1986); Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747
P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Fisher ex rel.
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Worthen, 765
P.2d 839 (Utah 1988); State v. Maurer, 770
P.2d 981 (Utah 1989); State, In re R.D.S., 777
P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Whitehead v.
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920
(Utah 1990); State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d
487 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Rule 701
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ARTICLE VII.
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY.
Rule 701, Opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a
clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantially
the same as Rule 19, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971). Rule 56(1), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), contained similar language.

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendmerit, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender-neutral.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
r gn n y.
Relation to expert testimony.
r

Pregnancy.
The admission of a mother's testimony on
the subject of gestation period of her pregnancy
was not error. Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640
(Utah 1982).
COLLATERAL
A.L.R. — Ability to see, hear, smell, or otherwise sense, as proper subject of opinion by
lay witness, 10 A.L.R.3d 258.
Competency of nonexpert's testimony based
on sound alone as to speed of motor vehicle
involved in accident, 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.
Admissibility of nonexpert opinion testi-

Relation to expert testimony.
Trial court properly admitted testimony of a
security guard, who compared a photograph of
,, r , . . . 1 . 1
r , . , ,
a footprint to the footprints that he saw at
burgularized premises. The fact that a question might be capable of scientific determination does not make lay opinion inadmissible if
the provisions of this rule are met. State v.
Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987).
REFERENCES
mony as to weather conditions, 56 A.L.R.3d
575.
Competency of nonexpert witness to testify,
i n criminal case, based upon personal observation, as to whether person was under the influe n c e 0f drugs, 21 A.L.R.4th 905.

Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 56(2), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971), was substantially the
same.
Cross-References. — Blood tests to determine parentage, expert testimony, §§ 78-25-18
et seq., 78-45a-7 to 78-45a-10.

Discovery of expert's opinion, Rule 26(b)(4),
U.R.C.P.
Drug paraphernalia, expert opinion in determining nature of object as, § 58-37a-4.
Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting
nU mber of expert witnesses. Rule 16, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

„ . r
. .
Basis for opinion.
Discretion of court.
Foundation.
Qualification as expert.
Reliability.
Scientific evidence^
—Hypnosis.
Subjects of opinion.
—Drug use.
—Identification.
—Securities fraud.
—Sexual abuse.

—Suicide.

Cited
Basis for opinion.
Testimony of expert witness who relied on
conversations with witnesses out of court was
admissible, since he may have meant he found
statements of witnesses reliable for purposes of
his making judgment. Lamb v. Bangart, 525
P.2d 602 (Utah 1974).
Facts or data used by a properly qualified
expert in forming an opinion need not be in
evidence if they are of a type reasonably relied
on by experts in the witness's field of expertise.
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Admissibility of expert testimom as to crim
mal defendant s propensit\ toward sexual dew
ation 42 A L R 4th 937
Admissibility, a t criminal prosecution, of expert testimon> on reliability of e\ewitness tes
timony, 46 A L R 4th 1047
Admissibility of expert testimony a* to ap
Dropnate p u n i s h m e n t for con\ icted defendant
47 A L R 4 t h 1069
Right of independent expert to refuse to testify as to expert opinion 50 \ L R - t h 680
Necessity of expert testimony to snow stan
dard of care in negligence action against msur
ance agent or broker 52 A L R 4tn 1232
Thermographic tests admissibility of test results in personal mjurv suits 56 A L R 4th
1105
Compelling testimonv of opponent» expert
m state court, 66 A L R 4th 213
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence
of electrophoresis of dried evidential^ bloodstains, 66 A L R 4th 588
Right of indigent defendant in criminal case
to aid of state by appointment of investigator
or expert, 71 A L R 4th 638, 72 A L R 4th 874,
74 A L R 4th 388, 81 A L R 4th 259
Admissibility of expert testimonv that item
of clothing or footgear belonged to or w as worn
by, particular individual, 71 A L R 4th 1148
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or
enhanced testimony, 77 A L R 4th 927
Admissibility of he detector test results, or of

Rule 703

offer or refusal to take test, m attorney disciplinary proceeding, 79 A L R 4th 576
Admissibility, in criminal prosecution, of expert opinion allegedly stating whether drugs
were possessed with intent to distribute —
state cases, 83 A L R 4th 629
Admissibility of expert opinion stating
whether a particular knife was, or could have
been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A L R 4th
660
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal
case to assistance of ps>chiatnst or psychologist 85 A L R 4th 19
Admissibility, in criminal prosecution, of expert opinion evidence as to "blood splatter" interpretation 9 A L R 5th 369
Propriety of questioning expert witness regarding specific incidents or allegations of expert s unprofessional conduct or professional
negligence 11 A L R 5th 1
Admissibility, m homicide prosecution, of evidence as to tests made to ascertain distance
from gun to victim when gun was fired, 11
A L R 5th 497
Reliability of scientific technique and its acceptance within scientific community as affecting admissibility, at federal trial, of expert testimony as to result of test or study based on
such technique — modern cases, 105 A L R
Fed 299
Key Numbers. — Evidence «=> 470 et seq ,
505 et seq

Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts.
The facts or data m the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at
or before the hearing If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field m forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
Advisory Committee Note — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and expands Rule
56(2), U t a h Rules of Evidence (1971) which
limited facts or d a t a not personally known to
the expert to those made known to him at the
hearing The provision that the facts or data
upon which the expert rehe^ for his opinion in
a particular field may be of the tvpe reason
ably relied upon b> experts in the particular
field in forming opinions and need not otherwise be admissible also seams to expand Ruie

56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) But see
Lamb v Bangart, 525 P 2d 602 (Utah 1974)
Recent Utah cases have tended towards recognition of the position t a k e n bv this rule
Edwards v Didencksen, 597 P 2d 1328 (Utah
1979) Kallas v Kallas, 614 P 2d 641 (Utah
1980), State v Clayton, 639 P 2d 168 (Utah
1982)
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — Tne 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender r e u t r a l

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Discretion of court
Foundation
Impermissible bases
—Hearsay
—Specific cases
Permissible bases
—Facts or data relied on bv experts
—Specific cases
—Witnesses at trial
Cited
Discretion of court.
The trial court is allowed considerable lati-

tuoe of discretion in the admissibility of expert
testimonv, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse its decision will not be reversed
Lamb v Bangart, 525 P 2d 602 (Utah 1974)
Foundation.
Defendant's own testimony provided sufficient foundation for officer's expert testimony
rebutting defendant's intoxication defense See
State v Tennyson, 850 P 2d 461 (Utah Ct App
1993)
Impermissible b a s e s .
—Hearsay.
An expert's opinion may not be based on
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pute the new benefit amount, until after the provisions
of Section 35-4-5(d) no longer apply. Any such redetermination must be requested by the claimant and will be
effective the beginning of the week in which the written
request for a redetermination is made.
R562-5d-ll. Availability.
If benefits are not denied under Section 35-4-5(d),
time spent walking picket lines, working for the bargaining unit, etc. must be considered with regard to the
claimant's availability for work. A refusal to seek work
except with employers involved in a lockout or strike is
a restriction on availability which also must be considered in accordance with the regulations for Section 354-4(c).
R562-5d-12. Suitability of Work Available Due to a
Strike.
Section 35-4-5(c)(2) provides that new work is not
suitable and benefits shall not be denied if the position
offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout or
other labor dispute. If the claimant was laid off or furlough ed prior to the strike, and an offer of employment
is made after the strike begins by the former employer,
it is considered an offer of new work. The vacancy must
be presumed to be the result of the strike unless the
claimant had a definite date of recall, or recall has historically occurred at a similar time.
R562-5d-13. Strike Benefits.
Strike benefits received by a claimant which are paid
contingent upon walking a picket line or for other services are reportable income which must be deducted
from any weekly benefits to which the claimant is eligible in accordance with provisions of Section 35-4-3(c).
Money received for performance of services in behalf of
a striking union may not be subject wages used as wage
credits in establishing a claim. However, money
received as a general donation from the union treasury
which requires no personal services is not reportable
income.
KEY: unemployment compensation, strikes
1987

35-4-5d

R562-5e. F r a u d .
R562-5e-l. General Definition.
R562-5e-2. Elements of Fraud.
R562-5e-3. Evidence and Burden of Proof.
R562-5e-4. Disqualification and Penalty.
R562-5e-5. Repayment.
R562-5e-6. Future Eligibility.
R562-5e-7. Examples.
R562-5e-l. General Definition.
The Department relies primarily on information provided by the claimant when paying unemployment
insurance benefits. The Act provides severe penalties
for fraud, but the provisions of this section do not apply
if the overpayment was the result of an inadvertent
error. There must be a willful misrepresentation or concealment of information for the purpose of obtaining
unemployment benefits to which the claimant was not
entitled for fraud to exist. The absence of an admission
or direct proof of intent to defraud does not prevent the

R562-5e-3

conclusion that the claimant violated this section of the
Act.
R562-5e-2. Elements of Fraud.
The elements necessary to establish an intentional
misrepresentation sufficient to be considered fraud are:
1. Materiality
Materiality is established when the claimant makes
false statements or fails to provide accurate information for the purpose of obtaining waiting week credit or
any benefit payment to which he is not entitled. Benefits received by reason of fraud may include an amount
as small as $1 over that which the claimant was entitled to receive.
2. Knowledge
The claimant must have known, or should have
known that the information he submitted to the
Department was incorrect or that he failed to provide
information required by the Department. He does NOT
have to know that the information will result in a
denial of benefits or a reduction of the benefit amount.
Knowledge is established when a claimant recklessly
makes representations knowing he has insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representations
either because he failed to read material provided by
the Department or to inquire when there was a question about what he was required to report.
3. Willfulness (Control)
The claimant must have made the false statement or
omission for the purpose of obtaining benefits. Purpose
or willfulness to receive benefits is established when
the claimant files claims or other documents containing
false statements or omissions. If he delegates his
responsibility to personally provide information to
another person, it is done contrary to instructions from
the Department, and he is responsible for the information provided or omitted by the other person, even when
he did not have advance knowledge that the information thus provided or omitted was false.
R562-5e-3. Evidence and Burden of Proof.
1. Prior Knowledge of Ineligibility by the Department
If the Department has evidence sufficient to assess a
disqualification prior to the granting of benefits, a fraud
disqualification will not be assessed even if the documents submitted by the claimant contained false statements or omissions. However, overpayments may be
established in accordance with the provisions of Sections 35-4-6(d) or Ce) as appropriate.
2. Initial Burden of Proof
Fraud cannot be presumed whenever false information has been provided or material information omitted
and benefits have been overpaid. The Department has
the burden of proof which is the responsibility to establish in the record that all the elements of fraud are
present before a disqualification can be assessed.
3. Standard of Proof
The existence of the elements of fraud must be established by a preponderance of evidence of the nature
relied upon by reasonable individuals in the conduct of
their affairs. There does not have to be an admission or
direct proof of intent.
4. Procedure
A disqualification will be assessed under this provision of the Act if the claimant provides a sworn written
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admission of all the elements of fraud. A sworn written
admission is one wherein the signer declares or certifies
t h a t he knowingly withheld material information to
receive benefits to which he was not entitled. In the
absence of a sworn written admission, the claimant
m u s t be given an opportunity for a recorded hearing
after he has been given notice of the issue, allegations,
and possible penalties. If the claimant waives his right
to a hearing by so advising the Department or failing to
a t t e n d the hearing after receiving a notice, the Departm e n t will issue a decision based on the available information if that information is reasonably considered to
be reliable. However, if the claimant failed to receive
notice of the hearing due to circumstances beyond his
control, his right to a hearing is not considered to have
been provided, and, unless he waives his right to an initial hearing, the decision m u s t be vacated and a new
h e a r i n g scheduled. For example: If at the time the
notice of hearing was mailed the claimant had moved
and therefore, the notice of hearing was not sent to his
current address, the failure to receive the notice is
beyond his control because he was not filing for unemployment insurance benefits a t the time the notice was
mailed and he had no obligation to provide the Departm e n t with a correct address.
R562-5e-4. Disqualification a n d Penalty.
1. Penalty Cannot Be Modified
The Department has no authority to reduce or otherwise adjust the period of disqualification or the monetary penalties required by the Act.
2. Penalty Period
If the claimant has fraudulently filed for benefits, the
penalty for future weeks is 13 weeks for the first week
of fraud, and 6 weeks for each additional week of fraud,
not to exceed a total penalty period of 49 weeks. The
penalty period begins on the Sunday following the initial issuance by the D e p a r t m e n t of the Notice of Denial
of Benefits with regard to t h e issue of fraud.
3. Week of Fraud
A "week with respect to which" includes each week for
which waiting week credit is given or any payment has
been claimed as the result of fraud.
4. Overpayment and Administrative Penalty
When a claimant is found to have committed fraud, he
is disqualified and an overpayment will be established
for the amount of benefits actually received for the
week(,s). In addition, the claimant is required to pay as
a penalty the amount of benefits actually received as a
direct result of the fraud for the week(s).
a. ''Benefits actually received" means the benefits
paid or constructively paid by the Department. Constructively paid means those benefits used to reduce or
off-set a n overpayment or used as a payment to the
Office of Recovery Services for child support obligations
or other payments permitted by law.
5. Additional Penalties
Criminal fines and imprisonment for acts of fraud
m a y be pursued as provided by Section 35-4-19(a) of the
Act, in addition to the administrative penalties.
R562-5e-5. R e p a y m e n t .
Repayment of overpayments established under this
section of the Act will be collected in accordance with
provisions and Rules of Section 35-4-6(d) or by civil
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action or w a r r a n t as provided by Sections 35-4-17(c)
and (e). The Department will use unemployment insurance benefits due for weeks prior to the penalty period
to reduce overpayments.
R562-5e-6. F u t u r e Eligibility.
A claimant is ineligible for any unemployment benefits or waiting week credit following the disqualification
for fraud as long as any amount is owed. Therefore, the
overpayment established under this section of the Act
may NOT be satisfied by deductions from benefit checks
for weeks claimed after the penalty period ends,
because the claimant cannot receive any future benefits
or credit for a waiting week as long as there is an outstanding fraud overpayment. However, he may be
allowed to file a subsequent initial claim to protect his
rights to benefits with respect to a benefit year. An overpayment is considered satisfied at the beginning of the
week in which the cash payment is received by the
Department or in the case of payment by personal
check, the beginning of the week in which the check h a s
been honored by the bank. If the claimant was not
aware a t the time of filing an initial claim t h a t he had
an outstanding fraud overpayment, benefits will be
allowed as of the effective date of the new claim if the
claimant repays the overpayment within seven (7) days
of when he is advised of the overpayment.

R562-5e-7. E x a m p l e s .
1. Failure to Report Reason for Separation
If the claimant failed to report the correct reason for
separation which, if reported, would have resulted in
an indefinite disqualification; the elements of fraud are
established; and he consequently received 26 weeks of
unemployment insurance benefits to which he was not
entitled, fraud is committed with respect to all 26
weeks because all the subsequent payments were made
as a result of the fraudulent omission, even though
false statements were not made during each of those
weeks. An overpayment must be assessed for each of
the 26 weeks, and the penalty period is 13 weeks for the
first week and 6 weeks for each additional week, up to
49 weeks. The claimant must repay twice t h e amount
received for all 26 weeks.
2. Failure to Report Earnings
If the claimant has a weekly benefit a m o u n t of $100
and reports no earnings, when in fact he earned $50, he
was overpaid $20 after consideration of the 30% earnings allowance. However, if he is found to have committed fraud with respect to this week, he will be
disqualified for the week under Section 35-4- 5(e) and
all benefits received for a week of disqualification m u s t
be repaid. The overpayment is $100 for the week and an
additional penalty of $100 which is the fraud penalty.
He is required to repay $200. He will also be penalized
for 13 weeks beginning with the Sunday following the
issuance of the decision.
KEY: fraud
1988
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party, with a clear s t a t e m e n t of the right of appeal or
judicial review. If a request for reopening is made, a
hearing will be scheduled and notice will be given or
mailed to each party to the appeal, to determine if t h e r e
is good cause for reopening the hearing
a. Failure to report as instructed at the time and place
of the scheduled h e a r i n g is the equivalent of failing to
participate even if the party reports at another time or
place. In such circumstances, the party must m a k e a
written request for rescheduling and show good cause
in accordance with these Rules before the matter will be
rescheduled.
b. Good cause for failing to participate in an appeal
hearing may not include such things as:
(1) Failure to read and follow instructions on the
notice of hearing,
(2) Failure to a r r a n g e personal circumstances such as
transportation or child care,
(3) Failure to a r r a n g e for receipt or distribution of
mail,
(4) Failure to delegate responsibility for participation
in the hearing,
(5) Forgetfulness.
c. In the event t h a t an appeal h a s been taken or an
application for review h a s been made to the Board of
Review before t h e request for reopening is filed, such
request will be referred to the Board of Review.
R562-6c-12. W i t h d r a w a l of A p p e a l .
Any party who h a s filed an appeal from a decision of
the Department m a y request withdrawal of the appeal
by making a request to a n Administrative Law J u d g e ,
explaining the r e a s o n s for the withdrawal. The Administrative Law J u d g e m a y deny such a request if t h e
withdrawal of t h e appeal could result in a disservice to
any of the parties, including the Commission.
R562-6c-13. C o m m i s s i o n a P a r t y to P r o c e e d i n g s .
The Departments is the authorized agent of the commission. The Act requires t h a t the commission be given
notice of the pendency of an appeal and t h a t the commission will be a p a r t y to the proceedings. Unless t h e
Department designates a representative who is authorized to represent the Department in appeals, notification of appeals will be sent to the local office which
rendered the initial determination. As a party to the
hearing the D e p a r t m e n t or its representatives have all
rights and responsibilities of other interested parties to
present evidence, b r i n g witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, give r e b u t t a l evidence, and appeal decisions of
the Administrative Law J u d g e . Where the burden of
proof is with the Department, the failure of the Department to meet t h a t burden may result in an unfavorable
ruling for the D e p a r t m e n t . The Administrative Law
Judge cannot act a s t h e agent for the Department a n d
therefore is limited to including in the record only t h a t
evidence which is in the Department files or submitted
by Department representatives. Witnesses for the
Department may be called on the motion of the Administrative Law J u d g e when the need for such testimony
is necessary to clarify r a t h e r than impeach the testimony or evidence presented by the other parties, or the
need for such witnesses or evidence could not have been
anticipated by the Department prior to the hearing.
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R562-6c-14. P r o m p t N o t i f i c a t i o n of D e c i s i o n .
All decisions by Administrative Law Judges which
affect the rights of any party with regard to benefits,
tax liability, or jurisdictional issues will be issued
(mailed to the last known address of the parties or
delivered in person) in writing with a complete statement of the findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions
of law. Each appeal decision which is sent to the parties
will include or be accompanied by a notice specifying
the further appeal rights of t h e parties. The notice of
appeal rights shall state clearly the place and m a n n e r
for taking an appeal from the decision and the period
within which an appeal may be taken.
R562-6c-15. F i n a l i t y of D e c i s i o n .
Decisions of the Administrative Law Judge are binding on all parties and are the final decision of the Commission as provided by Section 35-4-10(0 unless
appealed within ten days of mailing or delivery of the
decision.
KEY: unemployment compensation, appellate procedures
1987
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R562-6d. Fault Overpayments.
R562-6d-l. General Definition.
R562-6d-2, Fraud.
R562-6d-3. Claimant Fault.
R562-6d-4. Method
of
Repayment
Overpayments.

of

Fault

R562-6d-l. G e n e r a l D e f i n i t i o n .
This section of the Act identifies the repayment
requirements of individuals who have been overpaid
due to fraud, or due to claimant fault not constituting
fraud.
R562-6d-2. Fraud.
1. When the Department h a s evidence of an overpayment resulting from the claimant's failure to properly
report material information, t h e claimant will be notified of the issue, given an opportunity for a hearing, and
told that payments are being held pending a decision.
In such circumstances, p a y m e n t of benefits for claims
currently m process may be held for up to two weeks
pending a hearing with regard to the issue of fraud or
the issuance of an overpayment decision. Benefit payments which have not been paid for eligible weeks prior
to the disqualification period under Section 35-4-o^e),
shall be used to reduce such an overpayment. 100% of
the benefit check to which he is entitled will be used to
reduce the overpayment.
2. The overpayment and penalties for fraud are established only when benefits h a v e been denied u n d e r Section 35-4-5(e). The a m o u n t of the repayment is
determined by t h a t Section of the Act and following
such a decision, m u s t be repaid in cash before the
claimant will be eligible to establish a waiting week
credit or receive future benefit payments. Therefore,
the overpayment and penalties cannot be offset.
R562-6d-3. C l a i m a n t F a u l t .
1. Elements of Fault
Fault is established if all three of the following elements are present. If one or more element cannot be
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established, t h e overpayment does not fall u n d e r the
provisions of this section of the Act.
a. Materiality
Benefits were paid to which the claimant was not
entitled.
b. Control
Benefits were paid based on incorrect information or
an absence of information which the claimant reasonably could have provided.
c. Knowledge
The claimant had sufficient notice that the information might be reportable.
2. Claimant Responsibility
The claimant is responsible for providing all of the
information requested of him in written documents
regarding his Unemployment Insurance claim, as well
as any verbal instructions given by a Department representative. Before certifying that he is eligible for benefits, he is u n d e r obligation to make proper inquiry if he
has any questions to determine definitely w h a t is
required. Therefore, when a claimant h a s knowledge
that certain information may affect his claim, but
makes his own determination that the information is
not material or if he ignores it, he is a t fault.
3. Receipt of Settlement or Back-Pay
a. A claimant is "at fault" for an overpayment created
if he fails to advise the Department t h a t grievance procedures are being pursued which may result in payment of wages for weeks he claims benefits.
b. When t h e claimant advises the Department prior to
receiving a settlement t h a t he has filed a grievance
with his employer, and he makes an assignment directing the employer to pay to the Department t h a t portion
of the settlement equivalent to the a m o u n t of unemployment compensation h e receives, he will not be "at
fault" if an overpayment is created due to payment of
wages a t t r i b u t a b l e to weeks for which he receives benefits. If the grievance is resolved in favor of the claimant and t h e employer was properly notified of the wage
assignment, the employer is liable to immediately reimburse the Unemployment Insurance Fund upon settlement of the grievance. If reimbursement is not made to
the Department consistent with the provisions of the
Assignment, collection procedures will be initiated
against the employer.
c. If the claimant refuses to make an assignment of
the wages he is claiming in a grievance proceeding, benefits will be withheld on the basis t h a t he is not unemployed because he anticipates receipt of wages. In this
case, the claimant should file weekly claims and if he
does not receive back wages when the grievance is
resolved, benefits will be paid for weeks properly
claimed provided he is otherwise eligible.
R 5 6 2 - 6 d - 4 . M e t h o d of R e p a y m e n t of F a u l t
Overpayments.
1. When t h e claimant h a s been determined to be "at
fault" in t h e creation of an overpayment, the overpayment m u s t be repaid. If payment is made by personal
check, no benefit checks will be released until the personal check h a s been honored by the bank. If the claimant is otherwise eligible and files for additional benefits
during the s a m e or any subsequent benefit year, 50% of
the benefit check to which he is entitled will be used to
reduce the overpayment.
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2. Discretion for R e p a y m e n t
a. Full restitution is required of all overpayments
established under this Section of the A c t At the discretion of the Department, however, the claimant may not
be required to make p a y m e n t s and legal collection proceedings may be held in abeyance. The overpayment
will be deducted from future benefits payable during
the current or subsequent benefit years. Discretion may
be exercised:
(1) if the Department or the employer share fault in
the creation of the overpayment, or
(2) if installment p a y m e n t s would impose unreasonable hardship such as in t h e case of an individual with
an income which does not provide for additional money
beyond minimum living requirements.
b. The Department cannot exercise repayment discretion for fraud overpayments and these amounts are
subject to all collection procedures.
3. Installment P a y m e n t s
a. If repayment in full h a s not been made within 90
days of the first billing t h e Department shall enter into
an agreement with t h e claimant whereby repayment of
the money owed is collectible by monthly installments.
The Department shall notify the claimant in writing of
the minimum installment payment which the claimant
is required to make. If t h e claimant is unable to make
the minimum installment payments, he may request a
review within ten days of the date written notice is
mailed or delivered.
b. Installment a g r e e m e n t s shall be established as follows:
Overpayments Equaling Minimum Monthly Payment
$3,000 or less 50% of claimant's weekly benefit entitlement
3,001 to 5,000 100% of claimant's weekly benefit entitlement
5,001 to 10,000 125%. of claimant's weekly benefit
entitlement
10,001 or more 150% of claimant's weekly benefit
entitlement
c. Installment a g r e e m e n t s will not be approved in
amounts less than those established above except in
cases of extreme h a r d s h i p . An ability to make a minimal payment is p r e s u m e d if the claimant has a household income which is in excess of the poverty level
guidelines as established by the federal government
and used co grant waivers of overpayments under Section 35-4-6(e). The installment agreement will be
reviewed periodically a n d adjustments made based
upon changes in the claimant's income or circumstance.
A due date will be established for each installment
agreement which is m u t u a l l y agreed upon by the claimant and the Department.
4. Collection Procedures
a. Billings are s e n t to claimants with overpayments
on a monthly basis. After 30 days, if payment is not
made, the account is considered delinquent. If no payment h a s been received in 90 days the individual is
notified t h a t a w a r r a n t will be filed unless a payment is
received within 10 days. However, there may be other
circumstances under which a w a r r a n t may be filed on
any outstanding overpayment. A w a r r a n t attaches a
lien to any personal or real property and establishes a
judgment that is collectible under Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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b. All outstanding overpayments are reported to the
State Auditor for collection whereby any refunds due to
the individual from State income tax or any such
rebates, refunds, or other amounts owed by the state
and subject to legal a t t a c h m e n t may be applied against
the overpayment.
5. Offset In Time
Offset in time occurs when the claimant files valid
weekly claims to replace weeks of benefits which were
overpaid. When an overpayment is established after
the claimant h a s exhausted all benefits, the claimant
may file claims for additional weeks during t h e same
benefit year provided he is otherwise eligible. Offset in
time will be allowed on claims t h a t have expired if a
written request is m a d e within 30 days of the notification of the overpayment. No offset in time will be
allowed on overpayments established under Section 354- 5(e) of the Employment Security Act. One h u n d r e d
percent (100%) of t h e weekly benefit amount for the
weeks claimed will be credited against the established
overpayment u p to t h e a m o u n t of the balance owed to
the Department. No penalty for late filing will be
assessed when a claimant is otherwise eligible to file
claims to offset in time.
6. Overpayments Not Set Up (NSU)
The minimum overpayment amount which will be
established is determined by multiplying the s t a t e
maximum weekly benefit amount by 15% and rounding
the result to t h e next highest $5. Overpayments of less
t h a n this a m o u n t will not be set u p (NSU), except if the
overpayment is t h e result of fraud, as the amount does
not justify the expense of collection. Accumulations of
overpaid benefits, accruing from more than one week,
which equal more t h a n the minimum overpayment
amount may be established.
KEY: unemployment compensation, overpayments
1990
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R562-6e. Non-Fault Overpayments.
R562-6e-l. General Definition.
R562-6e-2. Responsibility.
R562-6e-3. Method of Repayment.
R562-6e-4. Waiver of Recovery of Overpayment.
R562-6e-5. Overpayments Not Set Up (NSU).
R562-6e-l. G e n e r a l D e f i n i t i o n .
This section of t h e Act identifies the repayment
requirements of individuals who have received an overpayment of benefits through no fault of their own. Such
overpayments are referred to as "accounts not receivable" (ANR).
R562-6e-2. R e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
1. The claimant is responsible for providing all of the
information requested in written documents as well a s
any verbal request from a Department representative.
If the claimant h a s provided such information, a n d
then receives benefits to which he is not entitled
through an error of t h e D e p a r t m e n t or an employer, he
is not at fault for t h e overpayment.
2. "Through no fault of his own "does not mean t h e
claimant can shift responsibility for providing correct
information to a n o t h e r person such as a spouse, parent,
or friend. The claimant is responsible for all informa-
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tion required on his claim.
R562-6e-3. M e t h o d of R e p a y m e n t .
Even though the claimant is without fault in the creation of the overpayment, 50 percent of the claimant's
weekly benefit amount will be deducted (offset) from
any future benefits payable to him until the overpayment is repaid. No billings will be made and no collection procedures will be initiated.
R562-6e-4. W a i v e r of R e c o v e r y of O v e r p a y m e n t .
If waiver of recovery of overpayment is granted, the
amount of the overpayment owing at the time the
request is granted is withdrawn, forgiven or forgotten
and the claimant has no further repayment obligation.
Granting of a waiver will not be retroactive for any of
the overpayment which h a s already been offset except
if the offset was made pending a decision on a timely
waiver request.
1. Time Limitation for Requesting Waiver
A waiver m u s t be requested within 10 days of the
notification of opportunity to request a waiver or within
10 days of the first offset of benefits following a reopening or upon a showing of a significant change of the
claimant's financial circumstances. Good cause will be
considered if the claimant can show the failure to
request a waiver within these time limitations was due
to circumstances which were reasonable or beyond his
control.
2. Basic Needs of Survival
The claimant m a y be granted a waiver of the overpayment if recovery by 50 percent offset would create an
inability to pay for the basic needs of survival for the
immediate family, dependents and other household
members. In m a k i n g this waiver determination, the
Department shall take into consideration all the potential resources of t h e claimant, the claimant's family,
dependents and other household members. The claima n t will be required to provide documentation of
claimed resources. The claimant m u s t also provide
social security n u m b e r s of family members, dependents
and household members. "Economically disadvantaged "for federal programs is defined as 70 percent of
the Lower Living Standard Income Level (LLSIL).
'Inability to meet the basic needs of survival "is defined
consistent with "economically disadvantaged. "Therefore, if the claimant's total family resources in relation
to family size a r e not in excess of 70 percent of the
LLSEL, the waiver will be granted provided the economic circumstances are not expected to change withm
an indefinite period of time. Individual expenses will
not be considered.
3. Indefinite Period
An indefinite period of time is defined as the current
month and at least the next two months. Therefore, t h e
duration of the financial h a r d s h i p m u s t be expected to
last at least three months. If t h e claimant or household
members expect to r e t u r n to work within the t h r e e
months the anticipated income will be included in
determining if h e lacks basic needs of survival for an
indefinite period of time. Available resources will be
averaged for the three months.
R562-6e-o. O v e r p a y m e n t s N o t S e t Up (NSU).
The minimum overpayment amount which will be
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efits overpaid as a result of a Department decision
which is later reversed. Any benefits established as an
overpayment due to claimant fault will be deducted
from the employer's liability or refunded as the overpayment is repaid by the claimant.
R562-75-6. R e c o r d s of B e n e f i t s P a i d .
The Department will maintain records of benefits
paid to former employees of reimbursable employers for
five calendar years. Such records will include the name
and social security account number of each employee,
the week for which p a y m e n t is made, and the a m o u n t
of each payment.
R562-75-7. M o n t h l y B i l l i n g of Benefits P a i d .
The Department will send a monthly billing to the
reimbursable employer if any benefits have been paid
to former employees. The billing will include the n a m e
and social security account number of each claimant,
the amount of the p a y m e n t to each claimant on the
basis of wages paid to him by the reimbursable
employer in his b a s e period, and the total amount paid
to all such claimants d u r i n g the previous calendar
month.
KEY: unemployment compensation, nonprofit organization
1989
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R562-85. Governmental Units.
R562-85-1. General Definition.
R562-85-2. Governmental Units.
R562-85-3. Effective
Period
of Payments
by
Contributions or Reimbursement.
R562-85-4. Liability of a Governmental Unit When
Changing the Method of Payment.
R562-85-5. Reimbursable Employer's Liability for
Benefits Paid.
R562-85-6. Records of Benefits Paid.
R562-85-7. Monthly Billing of Benefits Paid.
R562-85-1. G e n e r a l D e f i n i t i o n .
1. Only part of Section 35-4-8.5 of the Act is quoted
above; the balance of t h i s Section of the Act describes
how governmental u n i t s elect the method of paying for
benefits, the effective period of such election, billing
and collection procedures for the reimbursement
method and appeal r i g h t s related to the election.
2. Governmental u n i t s described in paragraph B of
this Rule will pay contributions in the same m a n n e r as
other employers (see Section 35-4-7) unless they elect to
become reimbursable employers which are liable for
payments in lieu of contributions. A governmental u n i t
which elects to become a reimbursable employer pays to
the Department an a m o u n t equal to the regular benefits and all of t h e extended benefits paid to former
employees. These r e i m b u r s e m e n t s for benefits paid are
due and payable monthly. Reimbursable employers do
not pay any administrative expenses of the unemployment insurance p r o g r a m .
R562-85-2. G o v e r n m e n t a l U n i t s .
The governmental u n i t s to which this section of the
Act applies are any county, city, town, school district, or
political subdivision a n d instrumentality of the foregoing or any combination thereof. This section also
applies to political subdivisions or instrumentalities of
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the State of Utah or other s t a t e s as provided by Section
35-4-22(j)(2)(D)(iii). A political subdivision or instrumentality of a state, county, city, town or school district
is a subdivision thereof to which has been delegated
certain functions of that state, county, etc. Examples of
governmental units to which this section applies are
county water conservancy districts, state universities,
city fire departments, associations of county governments, etc. Indian tribes are not among the governmental entities included in this section and do not qualify to
elect reimbursable status. The provisions of this rule to
not apply to federal agencies.
R 5 6 2 - 8 5 - 3 . E f f e c t i v e P e r i o d of P a y m e n t s b y
C o n t r i b u t i o n s or R e i m b u r s e m e n t .
1. Initial Election
A governmental unit electing to become a reimbursable employer m u s t make a written election within 30
days after the organization become subject to the Act.
The Department may for good cause extend the 30 day
period within which the election is made. This initial
election remains in effect for a t least one full contribution year (calendar year).
2. Subsequent Elections
A governmental unit may elect to change from the
contributions to the reimbursement method or from the
reimbursement method to the contributions method. Tb
be consistent with the principle of Subsection 35-48.5(a)(4), changes from one method to the other will
remain in effect for at least two contribution years (calendar years). Any election to change from one method
of payment to the other m u s t be made in writing no
later than 30 days prior to J a n u a r y 1 of the year for
which the change is requested. The Department may
for good cause extend the 30 day period within which a
change from one method to the other is requested. As
provided by Subsection 35-4-8.5(c), the Department
may terminate t h e reimbursement s t a t u s if the governmental unit is delinquent in m a k i n g the reimbursement payments.
R562-85-4. Liability of a G o v e r n m e n t a l U n i t W h e n
C h a n g i n g t h e M e t h o d of P a y m e n t .
A governmental unit changing from the reimbursement to the contributions method m u s t reimburse the
Department for benefits paid on wages earned during
the time the organization w a s a reimbursable
employer. Example: A governmental unit was a reimbursable employer during 1985 and 1986. For 1987 the
organization elects to pay contributions. If a former
employee receives benefits in 1987 based on wages paid
by the organization in 1986, the organization must
reimburse the Department for t h e benefits based on the
1986 wages. The organization m u s t also pay contributions on the 1987 wages. If t h i s organization changes
back to the reimbursement m e t h o d in 1989, any benefits received by a former employee which were based on
wages paid in 1988 would not be subject to reimbursement since contributions h a v e been paid on those
wages.
R562-85-5. R e i m b u r s a b l e E m p l o y e r ' s Liability for
Benefits P a i d .
The reimbursable employer's liability will be limited
to the benefits paid to the claimant and benefits over-
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paid as a result of t h e failure of the reimbursable
employer to provide complete a n d accurate information
within the time limitations of the Department's
request. The employer will be liable even if good cause
for the failure to properly provide the information can
be established. The employer will not be liable for benefits overpaid as a result of a Department decision
which is later reversed. Any benefits established as an
overpayment due to claimant fault will be deducted
from the employer's liability or refunded as the overpayment is repaid by t h e claimant. Federal regulation
20 CFR Sections 609.11 and 614.11 state that federal
agencies receive adjustments (credits) when overpayments are recovered.
R562-85-6. R e c o r d s of B e n e f i t s P a i d .
The Department will m a i n t a i n records of benefits
paid to former employees of reimbursable employers for
five calendar years. Such records will include the n a m e
and social security account n u m b e r of each employee,
the week for which p a y m e n t is made, and the amount
of each payment.
R562-85-7. M o n t h l y B i l l i n g of Benefits P a i d .
The Department will send a monthly billing to t h e
reimbursable employer if any benefits have been paid
to former employees. T h e billing will include the n a m e
and social security account n u m b e r of each claimant,
the amount of t h e p a y m e n t to each claimant on the
basis of wages paid to h i m by the reimbursable
employer in his base period a n d t h e total amount paid
to all such claimants d u r i n g t h e previous calendar
month.
KEY: unemployment compensation, government corporations
1389
35-4-8.5

R568. Industrial Accidents,
R568-1. Workers* Compensation Rules - Procedures.
R568-2. Workers* Compensation Rules - Health Care
Providers.
R568-3. Workers* Compensation Rules - Self-Insurance.
R568-4. Premium Rates.

R568-1. Workers' Compensation Rules Procedures.
R568-1-1. Definitions.
R5 68-1-2. Authority.
R568-1-3. Official Forms.
R568-1-4. Pleadings and Discovery.
R568-1-5. Allowance for Mailing.
R568-1-6. Business Hours.
R568-1-7. Attorney Fees.
R568-1-8. Witness Fees.
R568-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
R568-1-10. Compensation for Medical Testimony.
R568-1-11. Discount.
R568-1-12. Interest.
R568-1-13. Issuance of Checks.
R568-1-14. Acceptance/Denial of a Claim.
R568-1-15. Compensation Agreements.
R568-1-16. Settlement Agreements.
R 5 6 8 - M 7 . P e r m a n e n t Tbtal Disability.
R568-1-1. Definitions.
A. "Commission "- m e a n s t h e Industrial Commission
of Utah.

R568-1-3

B. "Applicant/Plaintiff"- m e a n s an injured employee
or his/her dependent(s) or any person seeking relief or
claiming benefits under the Workers' Compensation
and/or Occupational Disease a n d Disability Laws.
C. "Defendant "- means an employer, insurance carrier, self-insurer, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
and/or the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
D. "Administrative Law J u d g e "- m e a n s a person duly
designated by the Industrial Commission to hear and
determine disputed or other cases u n d e r the provisions
of Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, and of Title 63, Chapter
46b, U.C.A.
E. "Insurance Carrier "- includes all insurance companies writing workers' compensation and occupational
disease and disability insurance, t h e Workers' Compensation Fund, and self-insurers who are granted selfinsuring privileges by the Industrial Commission. In all
cases involving no insurance coverage by the employer,
the term "Insurance Carrier "includes the employer.
F. "Medical Panel "- means a panel appointed by the
Commission p u r s u a n t to the s t a n d a r d s set forth in Sections 35-1-77 and 35-2-56, U.C.A., which is responsible
to make findings regarding disputed medical aspects of
a compensation claim, and m a y m a k e any additional
findings, perform any tests, or m a k e any inquiry as the
Commission may require.
G. "Award "- means the finding or decision of the Commission or Administrative Law J u d g e as to the amount
of compensation or benefits due a n y injured employee
or the dependent(s) of a deceased employee.
R568-1-2. Authority.
This rule is being enacted u n d e r t h e authority of Sections 35-1-10, 35-2-5, and 35-10-11, U.C.A.
R568-1-3. Official F o r m s .
A. "Employer's First Report of Injury - Form 122 "This form is used for reporting accidents, injuries, or
occupational diseases as per Section 35-1-97, U.C.A.
This form must be filed within seven days of the occurrence of the alleged industrial accident or the employer's first knowledge or notification of the same. This
form also serves as O S H A F o r m 101.
B. "Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational Disease - Form 123 "- This form is used by all
medical practitioners to report their initial treatment of
an injured employee.
C. "Chiropractor's Supplemental Report - Form 124 "This form is to be filed with the insurance carrier or
self-insurer after each 15 t r e a t m e n t s administered by
the chiropractic physician
D. "Statement of Insurance Carrier or Self-Insurer
with Respect to Payment of Benefits - Form 141 "- This
form is used for reporting the initial benefits paid to an
injured employee. This form m u s t be filed with or
mailed to the Industrial Commission on the same date
the first payment of compensation is mailed to the
employee. A copy of this form m u s t accompany the first
payment
E. "Statement of Insurance Carrier or Self-Insurer
with Respect to Discontinuance of Benefits - Form 142
"- This form is to be used by insurance carriers or selfinsured employers to notify an employee of the discontinuance of weekly compensation benefits. The form
must be mailed to t h e employee and filed with the Com-
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